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The first sewers were built in 
Kansas City in 1871 and, until around 
1920, when the city began to gear up for 
the Ten-Year Plan, the city did not invest 
in any substantial way in the sewers and 
water systems. The Ten-Year Plan, a 
partnership between the Kansas City 
Chamber of Commerce and the 
Pendergast political team, expanded 
Kansas City's waterworks and sewer 
system and drew money during the 
Depression toward the metropolitan city 
on the rocky bluffs. The Plan can help us 
understand the real impetus behind 
public works projects in Kansas City and 
the way in which these projects changed 
the social geographical distinctions in the 
city. The Plan, that Kansas City passed 
during the 1930s and that became a 
blueprint for the national New Deal. 
I present the Ten-Year Plan as an 
example of a successful re-imagining of 
urban space in the first part of the 
twentieth-century. Not without its faults, 
the project extended basic services to 
those who badly needed them and 
sheltered Kansas Citians from the hard 
brunt of the national Great Depression. 
The plan re-imagined not only urban 
space and infrastructure, but also 
changed governmental decision-making 
and opened up public access to power by 
allowing Kansas City women, select 
leaders of the black community, and labor 
representatives to participate in a project 
that had real meaning for the entire 
Kansas City community. In this way, the 
Ten-Year Plan was truly unique and can 
serve as an example of flexible and open 
democratic governance. The Plan also 
helps us understand why environmental 
infrastructure was established and 
improved, and for what ends. 
Kansas City 1871-1920s 
The first sewers in Kansas City 
were constructed in 1871. The well-
known City Beautiful Movement had 
transformed Kansas City's suburban 
districts into lovely subdivisions with 
green spaces and single-family homes, 
equipped with toilets and water coverage 
yet in 1910, many of Kansas City's urban 
poor in the West Bottoms and the larger 
Northwest District were still without 
sewers and other basic sanitary services, 
let alone planned neighborhoods (Figure 
1). I will argue that the Ten-Year Plan 
unknowingly participated in the 
correction and the institutionalization of 
some of these inequalities. Not for 
environmental reasons, but rather for 
personal profit and development during a 
time of great economic stress. 
The Country Club Plaza, has long 
been an infamous example of racist 
housing policies put forward by urban 
governments in the early twentieth 
century. The deeds drawn up in the early 
part of the twentieth century lasted until 
the 1960s and restricted racial minorities 
from purchasing properties in the 
Country Club Plaza district. In the same 
period, Kansas City's parks and boulevard 
projects razed many neighborhoods that 
minorities, immigrants, and the working 
poor called home. 1 A 1911 report from 
the Kansas City Board of Public Welfare, 
heavily influenced by Jacob Riis' 1890 
publication How the Other Half Lives, 
states that "boulevards have been pushed 
through parts of the city where there 
were formerly bad housing conditions."2 
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These "bad housing conditions" were 
most often in poor and working class 
communities and were underserved by 
city sewerage and water. The report 
exemplifies the relocation of one black 
family in Kansas City by contrasting a 
photograph of a mother with four of her 
children with a photograph of the same 
space after it had been razed for a 
boulevard (Figure 2). 3 
Displacement like Kansas City's of 
the poor for the benefit of the 
infrastructure of the white and wealthy, 
especially boulevards and roads, 
happened in many major cities in the 
nineteenth and twentieth cities. 
Famously, it happened in the mid-
twentieth century in New York City 
during Robert Moses' controversial urban 
renewal project that resulted in the 
construction of the Brooklyn-Queens 
Expressway, or BQE, and in Los Angeles 
to the Mexican-American community in 
the Chavez Ravine, razed to make space 
for Dodger's Stadium. In this sense, 
Kansas City was an early variant of 
national efforts to "renew" urban spaces, 
often reinforcing and creating social 
dislocation and geographical segregation 
based on race and class. The picture of the 
family was likely taken in the first decade 
of the twentieth century, more than thirty 
years after Kansas City built its first 
sewers and roads, and illustrates the 
degree to which "development" was 
reserved for the white and wealthy. 
Several images in the Annual 
Report from the Kansas City Board of 
Public Welfare illustrate the degree to 
which the poor residents of Kansas City 
were living without basic services. Many 
of the shanty-districts of Kansas City, 
Missouri were home to only one sewer 
vault connection and most commonly 
shared one privy vault as a toilet for 
several families. The Board of Public 
Welfare reported that "It is not to the 
credit of Kansas City that we continue 
supine and tolerate the existence of more 
than 15,000 privies." The report states 
that "actual inspection and tabulation 
force us to admit that...51.7 per cent of 
our contrivances for the disposal of 
human waste are of the kind which 
sanitary science pronounces an absolute 
menace to health."4 In this era of Kansas 
City's "progress," the benefits of modern 
sanitation practices were reserved for 
less than half of Kansas City residents. 
Engineers, city planners, and 
politicians in this period focused on the 
City Beautiful Movement, the birth of 
suburbanization, and beautiful parks and 
boulevards. The citizens in Kansas City 
who were excluded by suburbanization 
and wealth were also excluded from 
many basic sanitary services and were 
disproportionately poor and working 
class immigrants and minorities. Most of 
the time they were just underserved, but 
in some cases, the sewage pipes were 
literally funneling sewerage into their 
neighborhoods. 
The engineers in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
did not fully consider the health of the 
natural environment either and believed 
that the healthiest way to dispose of 
wastewater was to release it into rivers 
without treatment. Even during 
subsequent renovations, the effect of 
sewers and pollution on rivers was not a 
large topic of discussion, though it was 
now and then mentioned.5 Although there 
were always voices for sewage treatment, 
for almost a century the government was 
content with temporary and fleeting 
repairs. Why, when the negative effects of 
the water and sewer systems of Kansas 
City were clear to many, did the city so 
persistently neglect to update its sanitary 
system? 
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Until the 1930s, Kansas City 
governments focused primarily on 
aesthetic concerns, informed by the City 
Beautiful movement in Kansas City, and 
on suburban development [rather than on 
improving working class neighborhoods. 
The beautification of the area around the 
Blue River, for example, figured most 
prominently in the minds of the 
politicians who asked Kansas Citians for 
tax money to make improvements. The 
districts that would benefit directly from 
the work were meant to pay the proposed 
funds. This meant that districts that did 
not or could not pay, including poor 
districts, could not access services or 
expect improvements. Before 1930, 
despite widespread sewer failures and 
inadequacies, bonds intended for more 
expansive sewer construction did not 
pass. 6 In such a time of neglect, the social 
geography of Kansas City—the lines of 
race and class-can be understood by 
looking at maps of sewer coverage. 
Pendergast and the Ten-Year 
Plan 
By 1930 the population of Kansas 
City was almost at 400,000 residents.7 
The density and growth necessitated 
more sanitation and water development. 
Enter the Pendergast machine, a political 
juggernaut that ruled Kansas City for 
many years through the concentrated 
power of Boss "Tom" Pendergast. 
Although there was rampant corruption 
in the Pendergast machine, the machine 
also made important contributions made 
to the working-class community. The 
Pendergast family was more concerned 
than its predecessors, for whatever 
reason, with public service projects in 
Kansas City than the old pre-boss politics 
had been. In large part this concern came 
from selfish motives. Pendergast owned 
construction company, and he saw that he 
could make a profit through constructing 
public works projects. This simple fact 
reveals something larger about the 
impetus behind public works projects in 
2 0 t h century Kansas City. 
The next phase of the development 
of Kansas City's sewerage lies with the so-
called "Ten-Year Plan," passed by the 
public by a four-to-one margin in 1931. 
With a long history of voter fraud in 
Kansas City, and a political system run by 
"Boss Tom" Pendergast and his machine, 
the story of the Ten-Year Program is 
much more intriguing than it may seem at 
first glance. It is a story full of corruption, 
but also full of large Depression-era 
spending projects that put many men to 
work during a time of widespread 
unemployment and anticipated the 
Keynesian strategies of the national New 
Deal. 8 The Ten-Year Plan thoroughly 
changed not only the economic landscape 
of Kansas City, but also its social 
geography, largely institutionalizing the 
separation between Kansas Citians of 
different classes and races. 
The Ten-Year Plan, as writer 
Amahia Mallea explains, was a truly a 
coalition formed of unlikely allies, a 
"bipartisan campaign of hundreds of 
individuals and organizations that pushed 
for voter approval of a 'unified plan' for 
city building."9 The Planning Committee 
was run by a "Pendergast-leaning" 
Republican and Chamber of Commerce 
President Conrad Mann, who established 
the "Committee of 1,000" to oversee the 
production and determine the areas of 
need that were affected by the final Ten-
Year Plan. 1 0 The Committee of 1,000 was 
said to include "all elements of the 
population and enlisted the best 
engineering, business and political minds 
to work out the details." 1 1 The Committee 
did include several leaders of women's 
organizations, along with business 
leaders from "nearly 100 civic, labor, and 
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business groups," but did not include, as a 
matter of policy at least, any committee 
members of color or of low socio-
economic status. 1 2 
In my research for this study, 
however, I did find a sheet of paper that 
listed thirteen members of the committee 
in red pencil and had "Negro" scrolled 
across the bottom. Of the thirteen, two 
representatives were women. These 
representatives included Chester Franklin 
of the Kansas City Call; Ida M. Becks of the 
Kansas City Urban League; L. Amasa 
Knox, Missouri's first black man elected to 
represent Jackson County; Dr. William 
Thompkins, a well-known associate of 
Pendergast's who later represented 
Kansas City as a recorder of deed for 
President Franklin Roosevelt in 
Washington D.C.; Thomas C. Unthank, 
founder of two private black hospitals in 
Kansas City; and Reverend D.A. Holmes of 
the large Vine Street Baptist Church, an 
outspoken critic of the Pendergast 
machine. 1 3 This is certainly an impressive 
roster. Most of these representatives 
came from the Eighth Ward, an affluent 
black neighborhood, very different than 
the West Bottoms. In any case, though the 
Committee did not adequately include all 
aspects of the population, it was certainly 
more representative, and accessible, than 
previous development projects had 
been. 1 4 
City Manager Henry McElroy was 
all but appointed to his position as City 
Manager by Tom Pendergast in 1925. His 
involvement as one of three men 
organizing the committee and a man very 
involved in the project from beginning to 
end suggest that he represented machine 
interests in the Ten-Year Planning 
Committee meetings. The inclusion of 
representatives from organized labor 
suggests that Boss Tom's dedication to 
the laboring community was influential in 
the final make-up of the Committee of 
1,000 and in the details of the final plan. 
The Plan proved to be especially 
aware of the working- and lower-class 
neighborhoods in Kansas City. Most of the 
work done in association with the Ten-
Year Plan "served districts in which 
reside persons of moderate or less than 
moderate means. Even before the 
depression, construction of these projects 
had been delayed by the inability of 
property owners to bear the burden of 
special assessments." 1 5 This attention to 
the working-class and poor 
neighborhoods of Kansas City seems to 
line up with Pendergast's philosophy of 
leadership that explicitly privileged 
"consideration [of working class] 
troubles...paving, a water main," etc," and 
one can guess that this kind of attention 
was being encouraged and facilitated by 
Pendergast and McElroy. 1 6 Additionally, 
the final plan stipulated that "so far as 
possible without sacrifice to the interests 
of the citizens at large, Kansas City 
engineers and architects will be employed 
and contracts for improvements will be 
let to Kansas City institutions."1 7 This 
policy was a major victory for Kansas City 
laborers who, due to the passage of the 
Plan, would be employed throughout the 
Depression at a level not seen in other 
metropolitan areas around the United 
States. At its peak, this landmark reform 
employed about 16,500 workers and 
expanded sewer and water coverage to 
many new neighborhoods. 
The projects introduced under 
Boss Tom helped avoid massive and 
widespread unemployment in Kansas City 
during the Great Depression. This fact 
makes Pendergast a more complicated 
figure to understand, for his machine did 
profit from widespread corruption and 
voter fraud, but also attended to the 
needs of working class citizens, handling 
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"all sorts of individual and neighborhood 
concerns-everything from expediting 
garbage collection to the filling of 
troublesome potholes." 1 8 
Pendergast's team used their 
experience with elections to make sure 
that the bond issue passed muster with 
the public. One historian states that 
Pendergast's machine played a much 
larger role than was officially recorded in 
the planning process, and "machine 
workers made sure the proposal passed 
by a four-to-one margin, far more than 
the required two-thirds vote." 1 9 In the 
official history of the Ten-Year Plan 
published in 1938 by the Chamber of 
Commerce, Where These Rocky Bluffs 
Meet, Pendergast is not mentioned at all. 
On top of the enormous voting strength 
the machine had at its disposal because of 
the favors and friendships developed by 
the wards and precinct captains, the mere 
employment roster of the City Manager 
Emergency Fund endowed any machine-
sponsored vote with enormous 
strength. 2 0 
Of course, the "city projects 
generated abundant business for 
Pendergast companies, especially" his 
Ready-Mixed Concrete Company. 2 1 
Another author adds that "the Ten-Year 
Bond campaign which reached a 
successful climax in the summer of 1931, 
midway between the political campaigns 
of 1930 and 1932 that established 
Pendergast's position as the boss of 
Kansas City and the political power in the 
state." 2 2 
The Ten-Year Plan became a 
blueprint for the national New Deal, and 
helped Kansas City avoid the worst of the 
Great Depression. The Pendergast 
machine and the Ten-Year Plan were 
among the first to provide equal access to 
sanitation services in the late 1920s and 
1930s. This is not to claim that the boss 
system effectively addressed all the issues 
of environmental degradation or path 
dependence. The original system that was 
expanded under the Plan was deeply 
flawed in environmental terms and 
disposed of wastewater, untreated, into 
the Missouri River. The Ten-Year Plan did 
not correct the flaws of the original 
system, but the old corrupt political 
machine did succeed in ending a long 
period of sanitation neglect among the 
poor neighborhoods of the city. 
In 1931 the Pendergast political 
machine (City Manager McElroy and 
Judge Harry S. Truman, both loyal to Boss 
Tom), along with the Chamber of 
Commerce, succeeded in pushing a large 
reform package through the city's bond 
process and combined these funds with 
monies from the federal government in 
order to initiate a new phase of major 
infrastructure development. They had the 
support of the Chamber of Commerce , 
loaded with Pendergast's political 
partners, a support that suggests how 
deeply powerful the machine was. The 
machine, through its Ten Year Plan, made 
possible widespread employment in a 
time of great economic stress, extended 
public services to those who badly needed 
them, and put Kansas City on the national 
map as a city that used its Keynesian 
economic policy to better the lives of its 
citizens in a concrete way. It appears that 
despite corrupt economic monopoly and 
nepotism, the Pendergast political 
machine some positive democratic and 
environmental effects. 
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Figure 1. 
This panorama is a bird's eye view of the West Bottoms area. The picture shows the 
Stockyards, the railways, the factories, and their interaction with the neighborhood. One 
can see the Kaw River in the background, while the Missouri River features in the front of 
the drawing. 2 3 
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Figure 2 . 2 4 
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